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Abstract: What do collective reputation and communal pastures have in com-
mon? Collective reputation is an important type of collective good produced 
by many business networks. We argue that it has the structure of a common-
pool resource, which points to the relevance of Elinor Ostrom’s theory about the 
community governance of natural common-pool resources. After adapting the 
Ostromian framework to the phenomenon of collective reputation, we explore 
the experience of two groups of winemaking enterprises in Hungary who set up 
systems of quality assurance in order to protect and improve their joint reputation. 
We examine if the conditions identified by Ostrom as favourable for the self-gov-
ernance of commons are also conducive to the governance of collective reputa-
tion. Our findings validate our conjecture that research on goal-oriented business 
networks may use insights from the mature theory of ‘governing the commons’. 
Potential pathways for further research are outlined.
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1. Introduction
What factors are conducive to the self-governance of collective reputation by 
business groups? In our paper, we attempt to identify these factors using a case 
study conducted in two Hungarian winemaking communities. We take the accu-
mulated insights about the governance of natural common-pool resources (CPRs) 
as the basis for our investigation. In particular, Elinor Ostrom and her co-authors 
were able to identify those resource and group attributes that were conducive 
to the emergence of successful self-governance for natural CPRs (Ostrom 1990, 
2005; Dietz et al. 2003).
Like communities managing natural resources, many business networks are 
also stable multilateral cooperative relationships that aim at providing certain 
types of collective goods (Kilduff and Tsai 2003; Provan and Kenis 2008). How 
relevant is Ostrom’s CPR-theory for such groups or networks of business organ-
isations? We show that at least one important type of collective good produced by 
business networks – collective reputation – has the structure of a CPR. For such 
cases, Ostrom’s theory is directly relevant. We show further that the conditions 
that were found to be favourable for the self-governance of natural resources can 
easily be reinterpreted for collective reputation. Aspects of collective reputation 
are analogous to attributes of a natural CPR; characteristics of a business com-
munity are analogous to those of a user group of the commons.
With a case study, we illustrate the relevance of Ostromian conditions for 
the production of collective reputation. We explore the experience of two local 
communities of winemaking enterprises in Hungary who set up self-governing 
quality assurance systems to protect and improve their collective reputation as an 
immaterial CPR. We examine whether the presence of Ostromian resource and 
user attributes was indeed a prerequisite of the emergence of self-governance in 
the two communities.
The case study illustrates the potential importance of collective reputation for 
stable groups of private organisations as well as the role of multilateral coopera-
tive efforts in producing it as a collective good. It also shows the fruitfulness of 
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applying Ostrom’s theoretical framework to purposeful, goal-oriented networks of 
organisations.1 Space does not allow us to dig into the institutional details of gov-
ernance in the two communities. In an accompanying article (Mike and Megyesi 
2016), we analyse if the principles of institutional design which Ostrom identified 
for the governance of natural CPRs are also present in the self- governance of 
 collective reputation.
First, we elaborate the concept of collective reputation as an immaterial com-
mon pool resource (Part 2). We then adapt Ostrom’s taxonomy of favourable 
resource and user attributes of natural CPRs to the phenomenon of collective 
reputation (Part 3). In Part 4, we present the case study and examine the validity 
of our conjecture that the presence of Ostromian attributes facilitates the self-
organisation of producer communities. The final section evaluates the results and 
concludes.
2. Collective reputation as a common-pool resource
CPRs are goods from which it is difficult to exclude or limit users, whose con-
sumption of the good subtracts from the units available to others. They present 
problems that ‘are among the core social dilemmas facing all peoples’ (Ostrom 
2005, 219). Although their most studied examples are natural or man-made agricul-
tural resources, such as common pastures, fishing grounds or irrigation systems, a 
great many other phenomena can be successfully analysed as CPRs, ranging from 
technological resources [e.g. frequency spectrums (Wormbs 2011)] to services 
[e.g. healthcare (Jecker and Jonsen 1995)] and immaterial goods [e.g. scientific 
information (Hess and Ostrom 2006)]. We study one type of immaterial CPR: the 
collective market reputation of producers in a geographic area. The reputations 
of ‘Swiss made’ watches, ‘Silicon Valley start-ups’, ‘Parma ham’ or ‘Bordeaux 
wine’ are maintained by groups of producers and may become ‘depleted’ just like 
common pastures, fisheries or water basins (King et al. 2002; Patchell 2008).
Reputation is a signal that helps overcome the information asymmetry 
between a producer and its customer. Reputation only works if customers receive 
sufficient and credible information at low cost about the quality of a product. 
For small firms, conveying reliable and easy-to-digest information may be pro-
hibitively costly. They may opt for creating a ‘joint brand’ with similar producers 
(Tirole 1996; Fishman et al. 2010). In other words, they can economise on the 
scale of investing in reputation. The development of a ‘local image’ (Ray 1998) 
or the use of geographical indication for similar products or services in a given 
region or locality (Van Ittersum et al. 2007) represent important instances of such 
a collective brand.
Collective reputation has been interpreted both as a pure public good (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993) and a CPR (Patchell 2008). Both concepts entail the  difficulty 
1
 We focus on ‘goal-oriented’ networks that are purposeful, as opposed to ‘serendipitous’ networks 
that are spontaneous (Kilduff and Tsai 2003).
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of exclusion. If a region is famous for its good wine, no local winemaker can be 
excluded from the benefits of its good reputation, unless there are special rules 
to exclude him. The difference between a pure public good and a CPR consists 
in subtractability: does the use of reputation by an individual subtract from the 
benefit of reputation for others, or not? We believe that, for a group of producers, 
a fundamental collective action dilemma is that they may individually abuse their 
collective reputation by producing low quality at a cost advantage and obtaining 
high benefit in the short run. Although they do not literally appropriate or con-
sume ‘units’ of reputation, they do subtract from its stock of value. Solving this 
problem requires the institutionalisation of quality control. Like for the natural 
commons, this may take the form of community self-governance.2
3. The relevance of Ostromian conditions
As noted above, Ostrom (1990, 2005) identified resource attributes as well as the 
attributes of resource users which had been found to increase the likelihood that 
self-governance for a natural CPR will emerge. These attributes can be interpreted 
in a relatively straightforward way for the collective reputation of local producers 
as an immaterial CPR. Table 1 summarises the original Ostromian conditions and 
their adaptations to collective reputation.
By analogy, we conjecture that the presence of all of the above attributes 
at least in a weak form enables the community to form institutions of self- 
governance with an aim to preserve and improve collective reputation. No sub-
stantial  institution-building can be expected in a group of producers as long as it 
is seriously lacking in any of these attributes.
4. Case study: Producers’ efforts to improve their collective rep-
utation in two Hungarian winemaking communities, 1990–2014
Most studies are sceptical of the viability of creating self-organised groups of 
producers in post-communist countries. The successful self-governance of CPRs 
is rarely observed. Their absence is usually explained as being due to a relative 
weakness of social capital in producer communities and the lack of supportive 
political and administrative context (Sikor 2002; Theesfeld 2004; Upton 2008; 
Schlüter et al. 2010; Schmidt and Theesfeld 2012). Yet, there are important excep-
tions, proving that such cooperative efforts can emerge even in a relatively hos-
tile socio-political environment (Mearns 1996; Gorton et al. 2009; Sutcliffe et al. 
2013). Our examples fall in the latter category.
2
 A third conceptual alternative is viewing the collective reputation of local producers as a club good, 
i.e. a good characterised by easy exclusion and no subtractability (Thiedig and Sylvander 2000; 
Rangnekar 2004). However, this ignores the difficulty of exclusion, which cannot simply be assumed 
to have been overcome.
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Two communities of winemaking enterprises, Csopak and Tihany, are located 
on the northern shore of Lake Balaton in the Midwest of Hungary. Both belong to 
a wine region with great traditions. Csopak is the region’s most famous locality 
for producing white wine, especially Riesling.3 Tihany is well-known for produc-
ing high quality red wine in the special climate of a peninsula, in a region other-
wise known for white wines. Starting from a virtual tabula rasa after the end of 
communism, producers in both localities struggled long to establish systems of 
quality assurance to protect and possibly improve their collective reputation as 
an immaterial CPR. Tihany succeeded in 2008, with Csopak succeeding in 2012. 
Although both initiatives are relatively recent and more time needs to pass until 
3
 To be precise, the grape variety is Olaszrizling (in Hungarian) or Welschriesling (in German). It is 
not related to Rhine Riesling and has a distinct character popular with Hungarians.
Table 1: Resource and user attributes favourable for self-governance: Comparing natural 
CPRs and the collective reputation of local producers.
Natural CPRs (Ostrom 2005, 244–5)  Collective reputation of local producers
Favourable 
resource 
attributes
Feasible improvement of resource 
conditions
 Feasible improvement of the market 
value of reputation (R1)
Reliable and valid indicators of the 
condition of the resource
 Indicators of present and future market 
value of reputation (e.g. predictions of 
demand, survey results, prizes, quality 
signals) (R2)
Predictability of the flow of resource 
units
 Predictability of flow of individual 
sales revenues (R3)
Sufficiently small spatial extent of 
the resource system to ensure accurate 
information on external boundaries 
and internal conditions
 Sufficient proximity of producers to 
lower the costs of personal meetings and 
monitoring of individual activities (R4)
Favourable 
attributes of 
users
Salience of the resource for users (in 
terms of income or identity)
 Salience of collective reputation for 
producers (in terms of income or 
identity) (U1)
Common understanding of how the 
resource system operates and actions 
affect it
 Common understanding of how 
collective reputation is established, 
maintained, and affected by actions (U2)
Low discount rate of users for future 
benefits from resource
 Low discount rate of producers for 
future revenues as a result of collective 
reputation (U3)
Trust and reciprocity among users  Trust and reciprocity among producers 
(U4)
Autonomy of users to determine 
access and create use rules
 Autonomy of producers to determine 
who may use the collective brand and 
under what conditions (U5)
Prior organisational experience and 
local leadership
Prior organisational experience and 
local leadership (U6)
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their robustness can be judged, in the post-communist context their very existence 
and functioning are significant achievements.
Based on in-depth fieldwork, we identified to what extent the resource and 
user attributes defined by Ostrom characterised the two winemaking communi-
ties after the end of communism and how these conditions changed over time. As 
we shall show, self-organisation indeed presupposed the presence of Ostromian 
resource and user attributes. Each community established its system of collec-
tive quality assurance only after these attributes were sufficiently available. This 
also explains why the two communities set up their respective system at different 
times. The late-coming group was thwarted for a time by the absence of some 
important attributes.
Fieldwork was conducted in both places in March–May, 2012. After study-
ing each community’s history and geography, statistical data on wine produc-
tion as well as official and press documents, 18 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with local winemakers, officials of the wine communes and represen-
tatives of local governments. In December 2014, follow-up information on the 
self-governing initiatives observed in 2012 was collected through the websites of 
interviewed winemakers, their associations and professional wine-related media.
4.1. Resource and user attributes of collective reputation in Tihany and 
Csopak after 1990
4.1.1. Resource attributes
Consumers’ perception of the quality and character of wine is influenced by the 
place of its production or ‘terroir’. Although the true significance of geography 
is continuously debated, geographical indications on labels are used more and 
more frequently to signal uniqueness and high quality (Johnson and Robinson 
2007). Hungary is a country with a rich history of long-standing local identities in 
winemaking. In what is perhaps the most famous literary treatment of Hungarian 
wine, The Philosophy of Wine (1998), Hamvas strongly emphasises the distinct 
characters of regions and localities. One highly praised region is the district of 
Lake Balaton, among whose outstanding and idiosyncratic localities he mentions 
both Csopak and Tihany. The association of narrow locality and quality is now 
clearly present in local thinking, too. As an interviewee put it: ‘It is obvious that 
Lake Balaton or Transdanubia [the even larger region] are in general not known 
for high-quality wines. It would be against common sense to market high-quality 
Riesling produced in Csopak under such general names’.
The continuing presence of collective reputation was indirectly confirmed 
when winemakers reflected on the years around the end of communism: ‘the 
wine produced was uniform and mediocre; very often wine produced outside 
the region was bottled as ‘Tihany’ or ‘Csopak’ wine’. The reputation of both 
communities was at a long-time low in 1990, reflecting the deteriorated state 
of Hungarian viniculture in general. Creating a system of quality assurance 
became a key challenge.
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The Hungarian market for high quality wines emerged slowly but steadily. The 
first professional wine guide to orient consumers appeared in 1995. Nineteen years 
later, a national survey of consumer preferences (Research Institute of Agricultural 
Economics 2014) identified 16% of consumers as ‘wine experts’, 38% as ‘demand-
ing consumers’ and 46% as ‘non-distinguishing consumers’. ‘Wine experts’ said 
that terroir was most important for them, followed by grape variety, price and win-
ery. For ‘demanding consumers’, terroir ranked second after grape variety, while 
for ‘non-distinguishing’ buyers it ranked third. So terroir was clearly important in 
the upper segment of the market. The survey also showed willingness to pay for 
quality: 40% of respondents stated that they were willing to pay more than 3.5 
euros (the price level where any quality begins), and 10% were willing to pay more 
than 6.5 euros (where the top range begins).4 Although there are no direct indicators 
of the market value of collective reputations, several market actors emerged over 
time to provide useful feedback. ‘Hungarian Wine-Grower of the Year’ awards are 
given annually; numerous prize contests take place and several professional wine 
merchants with reputation organise markets for demanding customers (Tóth 2010).
From the perspective of the present, one can clearly see that the market value 
of collective reputations could be improved (R1), there are some indicators of this 
value (R2), and the slowly increasing demand for high-quality wine gives some 
predictability to revenues (R3) due to terroir reputation. However, these resource 
attributes strengthened very slowly as market development was protracted and 
uncertain throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Although we could detect no 
difference in the general market environment for the two communities, they do 
differ in one respect which affects the feasibility of improving the value of repu-
tation: size. Tihany has roughly 70 hectares of vineyards, while Csopak is con-
siderably larger with approximately 250 hectares. Both are small territories with 
wine-growers who work in proximity (R4) but Tihany producers can achieve less 
economy of scale in building a collective reputation.
4.1.2. User attributes
The basic structure of producers’ communities is similar throughout the whole 
statistical wine region officially entitled ‘Balatonfüred–Csopak’, to which Tihany 
and Csopak belong. In 2005, 5325 registered wine-growers cultivated 2270 hect-
ares, i.e. 0.43 hectare per capita. The vast majority (95%) of these people were 
part-time producers who drank their own wine or sold it (informally) to a local 
pub. They had no real stakes in either individual or collective market reputation. 
As the president of a wine commune put it: ‘Smaller producers are not worth 
talking about… because they do not belong to the future, sad as it may be’. There 
are also a few large-scale wineries5
 with more than 70 hectares, based outside of 
4
 About 25% of Hungarian wine is exported (Harsányi 2007), and winemakers in Csopak and Tihany 
agreed that foreign markets are, at least so far, of secondary importance.
5
 Three of them are remnants of a state farm and socialist cooperatives; one of them is a private 
investor.
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the localities, which focus on mass products and show no special interest in ter-
roir reputations. In between, there is a group of medium-sized private wineries 
which build their own brands and target quality. This is the group, consisting of 
10–15 cellars/community at most, whose members take an interest and are active 
in improving collective reputation. They can be divided into two subgroups which 
differ in many respects: (1) estates of local families and (2) non-local investors.
The former category consists mainly of local ‘self-made men’, who started 
winemaking in the 1980s as employees at a cooperative or state farm, engaged 
in individual production on small household plots, and acquired estates of 5–25 
hectares after de-collectivisation. They nurture close and trustful personal ties 
(U4) and share professional experience and views that go back to the era of com-
munism and often much longer. They view their enterprises as being embedded in 
a long chain of generations: ‘Professional know-how is transmitted from fathers 
to sons, from grandfathers to grandsons’. Their heirs work at the estate and plan 
to continue the family business. Their livelihood depends entirely on winemaking 
and complementary services, such as running a restaurant, a shop or a bed-and-
breakfast. The reputation of the winemaking community is clearly salient for them 
in terms of both identity and income (U1), and they plan for the long-term (U3).
Non-local investors arrived in the area mostly in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
They collected financial capital in other activities, and bought a cellar and land 
with the aim to produce high quality wine. Although the relations with the first 
group are mutually respectful, they are somewhat less embedded in local per-
sonal networks (U4). Their personal and family identity is less tied to the local 
winemaking community, and several of them draw income from non-wine-related 
activities. Nonetheless, the reputation of the terroir is economically salient for 
them as they target the higher end of the market (U1). Moreover, they do invest 
and plan for the long-term (U3). Their understanding of what is valuable in the 
terroir and how it should be developed (U2) differs from that of the typical local 
self-made-man. In interviews and marketing materials, they tend refer to ancient 
traditions that were broken during the communist era and the need to experi-
ment and learn from the outside world. The winemaker who is perhaps the most 
respected member of this group in Csopak emphasises on his website ‘50 years 
of lack of stewardship by the state’ and the ‘inheritance of mere ruins’; makes 
a pledge to remain ‘humble before traditions that were often broken but always 
revived’, take ‘the great wines of the world as one’s measure’ and ‘to experiment 
with everything’.6
However, the most marked difference of vision is not between local self-
made-men and non-local investors but between winemakers aspiring to different 
levels of quality. A cellar’s own brand strategy influences its understanding of how 
the reputation should be improved. This is a more or less general feature of any 
wine-growing area, due to the heterogeneity of market demand (Patchell 2008). 
6
 See the website at http://jasdipince.hu/?hu_trad%EDci%F3k,12 (Accessed: 05.08.2015).
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Obviously, those who target the higher end of the market tend to prefer stricter 
quality prescriptions for the community. Moreover, there is a growing interna-
tional trend, in which top producers tend to believe, that each community should 
focus on grape varieties that are historically typical of the area (Johnson and 
Robinson 2006). In this respect, Tihany and Csopak differ significantly. In Tihany, 
no grape variety has a particular historical distinction so producers are satisfied to 
agree that Tihany wine should be made of red grapes, chosen from a broad selec-
tion of grape varieties. By contrast, the role of Riesling in Csopak’s reputation is a 
matter of dispute. Some are quite liberal-minded: ‘If a producer thinks he can sell 
wine made of a certain grape variety, let him try’. Others are intransigent: ‘When 
I saw a new plantation of Chardonnay, I almost cried; good Chardonnay could be 
produced anywhere in the world, a good Csopak Riesling only here.’
If we compare the two communities, one important difference is that local 
family estates clearly dominate the group of medium-sized producers in Tihany, 
while non-local investors have a strong presence in Csopak. This implies, accord-
ing to our explanation above, that in terms of the salience of collective reputa-
tion for producers (U1), Tihany is in a somewhat more advantageous situation 
than Csopak. At the same time, they are not markedly different in terms of the 
producers’ discount rate (U3) or trust and reciprocity among producers (U4). As 
far as the common understanding of collective reputation (U2) is concerned, we 
detected no sharp divergence of views in Tihany but a clear lack of consensus 
in Csopak before 2010. This difference was partly due to the strong presence 
of non-locals in Csopak and the lack thereof in Tihany. More important was the 
unresolved dilemma of ‘Riesling only’ versus ‘any grape varieties’ in Csopak, 
while no similar debate plagued the community in Tihany. After 2010, the market 
success of Riesling advocates and professional discourse eventually led to the 
gradual convergence of views among quality-minded medium-sized wineries that 
Csopak’s collective reputation should be based on high-quality Riesling wine. 
However, producers who target lower echelons of the market have not become 
part of this consensus.
Another favourable circumstance in Tihany has been the presence of a 
respected local winemaker who has been accepted as a leading personality of the 
community (U6) since the 1990s. He had worked as an engineer for the state farm 
and carried his reputation over to a successful family estate. No such ‘natural 
leader’ was found in Csopak up to the early 2010s. Only then did a young person 
appear on the scene and start to organise collective efforts. He is the heir of a 
medium-sized family estate, whose owner is best described as having ‘one foot’ 
in the locals’ group (due to local ancestry) and ‘another foot’ in the investors’ 
group (having accumulated his wealth from non-wine-related activities outside 
Csopak). Thus, he was able to act as a trust broker (Upton 2008) between locals 
and non-locals. His efforts became meaningful also thanks to the convergence of 
views on the role of Riesling among quality-minded wineries.
After 1990, various groups of local winemakers engaged in several civic and 
market initiatives with the aim of promoting collaboration and improving their 
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collective reputation. As early as 1984, a ‘Wine Knighthood’ was established. 
Four ‘wine route’ associations, a ‘circle of friends of wine’ as well as some initia-
tives to promote local culture (including wine) for tourism followed. However, 
these organisations did not aim directly at quality assurance and tended to focus 
more loosely on the broader winemaking and touristic region of Balatonfüred-
Csopak. They are best interpreted as small steps in the process of developing 
organisational experience in the local communities (U6) that could be partly 
transferred to building self-governing systems of quality assurance.
As the mushrooming of initiatives attest, winemakers enjoy freedom and 
autonomy (U5) in establishing civic associations. However, a national legisla-
tion established official wine communes (hegyközség) (by Act CII of 1994) and 
designated them as official representative bodies responsible for wine adminis-
tration as well as quality assurance. In every wine region, each village or town 
was obliged to form a wine commune on its own or together with neighbouring 
villages (depending on their size). Although wine communes were conceived as 
self-governing bodies which could freely set their internal rules, they enjoyed 
only limited autonomy in drawing their own boundaries7 and no autonomy in 
determining membership, which was obligatory for all wine-growers and mer-
chants with vineyards above 1000 m2.
Table 2 summarises the resource and user attributes that have characterised the 
two communities since 1990, highlighting the most important differences as well 
as changes in the attributes (italicised). Throughout the 1990s, the uncertainty of 
market conditions in the aftermath of the collapse of communism implied unfa-
vourable resource attributes. It was unclear whether and to what extent the market 
value of reputation could be improved and how it could affect the flow of indi-
vidual sales revenues. Reliable indicators of the reputation’s market value were 
also largely missing. According to Ostrom’s logic, these factors formed a serious 
impediment to self-organisation in this period. This suggests that no successful 
attempt at institution-building could be expected before the early 2000s.
Wine markets and individual market positions consolidated by the early 2000s 
so the crucial question became if the producer communities had characteristics 
that made them fit for self-governance. As we explained, Tihany was not lack-
ing entirely in any of the Ostromian user attributes in this period. Despite some 
limitations, its circumstances were relatively promising. Its only enduring disad-
vantage compared to Csopak was its smaller size and the resulting more limited 
potential for increasing the market value of its collective reputation (R1). At the 
same time, Csopak was characterised by somewhat lower salience of collective 
7
 Wine-growers in the territory of each municipality could decide whether to form a separate wine 
community on their own or join producers in adjacent municipalities. However, the law prescribes 
a minimum wine-growing land size for a wine commune. Initially, this minimum was very low and 
virtually non-binding (50 hectares). In 2007, it was modified by legislation (Act CLV of 2007) to 
300 hectares, which led to involuntary mergers of wine communites throughout the country. Tihany 
was obliged to join its larger neighbour Balatonfüred-Szőlős at this time.
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reputation for its producers, especially in terms of identity (U1) and clearly lacked 
in two critical attributes in the 2000s: common understanding (U2) and local lead-
ership (U6). While the salience of collective reputation remained largely constant, 
the latter two factors changed around 2010 thanks to the convergence of views on 
the role of Riesling and the appearance of a young leader on the local scene. This 
suggests that Tihany already had the necessary qualities for setting up a system of 
quality assurance in the 2000s, while Csopak became capable of such action only 
in the early 2010s.
4.2. Institutionalising the management of collective reputation
The challenge of reviving the historical reputation of the two communities was 
already perceived by the newly founded private winemaking enterprises in the 
1990s. However, no serious effort was undertaken in either group until the middle 
of the decade of the 2000s. This finding corresponds to our expectation that self-
governance would not commence in this period because important preconditions 
of successful collective action were missing at the time. Most importantly, it took 
considerable time until the market potential of improved collective reputation 
became sufficiently predictable.
Also in accordance with our expectation, it was in Tihany where a self- 
governing system of collective quality assurance was first set up in 2008. In 
that year, the winemaking community successfully applied for the right to use a 
‘Protected Designation of Origin’ (PDO) label for Tihany wine and set up a gov-
ernance system to regulate its use. A PDO is the name of an area or specific place 
used as a designation for an agricultural product or a foodstuff. If a name is legally 
defined as a PDO, it may only be attached to the product if the production process 
is located in the specified area and follows specific methods (Van Ittersum et al. 
2007). In 2004, the Hungarian government adopted a new wine law (Act XVIII 
of 2004), which gave wine communes the opportunity to define a PDO for their 
produce and propose detailed rules for its enforcement. Tihany was one of the 
very few communities which took the opportunity.8
The adopted regulation defines detailed conditions under which a winemaker 
may attach the name Tihany and the acronym DHC (Districtus Hungaricus 
Controllatus) to his wine. Grapes must come from plantations that are officially 
classified as first class within the cadastral land register of Tihany. Eligible grape 
varieties, a ceiling yield, a minimum sugar content at harvest as well as cultivation 
and processing technologies are defined. The enforcement of rules is delegated to 
the wine commune. An elected official of the commune (hegybíró) monitors the 
plantations, inspects the grapes before the harvest as well as their processing in 
8
 By 2009, there were merely nine wine PDO regulations in force in Hungary (See the government 
website at http://boraszat.kormany.hu/jogszabalyok, accessed on 15.12.2014). At that time, the 
central government defined regulations for all wine regions by administrative means [Decree of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 99/2009. (VII. 30.)].
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the cellars. The official is accountable to the board of the commune, whose mem-
bers are elected by and accountable to the general assembly.
The Csopak community did not seize this opportunity to set up its own sys-
tem of quality assurance. There was no leader who would make the initiative, 
and there was no common understanding about the ways of improving collective 
reputation. The legal limits on the autonomy of the wine commune were more 
consequential in Csopak than in Tihany. The law required that all producers in the 
designated geographical area participate in crafting the self-governing system. 
However, the heterogeneity of views and interests as well as the lack of leadership 
precluded any meaningful consensus in Csopak. In 2009, the national government 
introduced PDO regulations by decree for all wine regions and localities that had 
not set up a self-organised solution by that time. However, these administrative 
rules did not aim at quality assurance. They were far too permissive to protect or 
improve collective reputation.
It took further four years until a subgroup of producers in Csopak embarked 
upon building a quality assurance system called Csopak Codex in 2012. Unlike in 
Tihany, it was set up outside the national framework that regulated PDOs. It still 
seemed impossible to convince all or even the majority of the wine commune to 
agree to a concrete set of quality prescriptions necessary for the improvement of 
collective reputation. Yet, a young winemaker could now act as an institutional 
entrepreneur relying on an emerging consensus among high-quality producers 
that Csopak should specialise in Riesling rather than a potpourri of grape variet-
ies. The Codex was adopted in 2012 and first applied to the wines of 2013. Eleven 
wineries participated in the process and gained the right to use the label. This 
means that basically all cellars that aim at high quality were willing to subject 
themselves to the process of certification and bear its non-negligible costs.
Quality assurance is based upon the registered trademark of Csopak Codex. A 
bottle of wine may carry this sign if it has undergone a strict multi-stage process 
of control and testing. Grapes, solely of the Riesling variety, must come entirely 
from first-class vineyards that belong historically to the Csopak wine commune. A 
Producers’ Committee is responsible for monitoring the entire production process 
and carrying out controls at four points. Its elected secretary and a representative 
of the municipality consensually select a Testing Committee of five independent 
wine experts. The municipality is also the formal owner of the trademark. Its 
involvement is mainly due to three reasons: (i) the use of the village name needs 
official acceptance (outside the PDO system); (ii) the municipality’s involvement 
makes it less likely that a rival group of producers receives similar support; and 
(iii) the producers’ group can use the municipality’s resources in its ‘fights’ with 
national authorities.
The robustness of these recently crafted systems of governance remains to be 
seen.9
 However, their establishment clearly tracked the occurrence of conditions 
9
 Ostrom defines robustness as long endurance and adaptability to disturbances (2005, 258).
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analogous to the resource and user attributes identified by Ostrom as favourable 
for the governance of natural CPRs. No institution-building effort was undertaken 
in either community until it acquired all of these attributes at least in a weak form. 
Tihany reached such a fortunate state sooner than Csopak. Therefore, it could 
embark upon successful institution-building earlier. Csopak was able to follow 
suit only when two gaps in the community’s attributes – the lack of common 
understanding and the absence of leadership – were finally overcome.
Despite important differences, both systems of quality assurance became insti-
tutionalised as ‘community governance’ (Ostrom 1994). The self-organisation of 
the producer groups is backed by the broad legal framework of PDO regulation 
and trademark law, respectively, but its rules are defined, applied and enforced 
by group members and office-bearers accountable to them. It is worth noting that 
Provan and Kenis (2008) distinguish three governance forms of goal-oriented net-
works: those governed by (i) participants, (ii) a lead organisation, and (iii) a net-
work administrative organisation. Our examples fall in the last category, in which 
a (rather simple) separate administrative entity is set up specifically to govern the 
network and its activities.
5. Conclusion
Collective reputation is an important type of collective good that requires the 
formation of a stable multilateral cooperative relationship among several auton-
omous organisations. We examined the efforts of two communities of private 
enterprises to maintain and improve their collective reputation by setting up self-
governing systems of quality assurance. The underlying analytical structure of 
their challenge closely resembled the structure experienced by users of natural 
CPRs. Collective reputation can be viewed as an immaterial CPR, which requires 
tending and investment as well as rules to contain free-riding and depletion. 
Ostrom (1990, 2005) identified a set of resource and user attributes generally 
conducive to the self-governance of natural CPRs. We conjectured and showed in 
our case study that the same attributes, properly reinterpreted, are also relevant for 
collective reputation. As long as they were not present, self-organisation could not 
commence. Once a community attained all necessary resource and user attributes, 
the institutions governing collective reputation were set up relatively quickly. The 
different timing of institution-building reflected the fact that the favourable con-
ditions materialised at different dates in the two communities. The ‘late-coming’ 
group was clearly held back for a time by the absence of two attributes: (i) a com-
mon understanding of how collective reputation is established and actions affect 
it; and (ii) leadership. Once a leader appeared on the scene and common under-
standing emerged, institution building was jump-started with startling speed. The 
quality and robustness of the specific institutions warrants further research. Here, 
we focussed on the preconditions and process of their establishment.
The validity of our findings needs to be explored further. Additional 
case studies and their subsequent quantitative meta-analysis (Poteete and 
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Ostrom 2008) can corroborate or modify the lessons learnt here. It is also worth 
considering that collective reputation can take many other forms. In our exam-
ples, individual enterprises (wineries) retained their individual brands but also 
introduced a common label. One can think of cases where independent produc-
ers market their products fully under a collective brand name. Alternatively, 
they may rely solely on individual brands while developing a non-branded form 
of collective reputation of trustworthiness or high quality. Do our findings also 
apply to such cases? Our theoretical framework suggests a positive answer but 
empirical verification is needed. Another possible line of inquiry would tackle 
other types of CPRs that may represent value for goal-oriented networks of 
businesses (Kilduff and Tsai 2003). A physical infrastructure or an informa-
tion pool (Hess and Ostrom 2006) may in effect be a CPR, too. Again, does the 
analogy implied by theory actually show up in similar empirical patterns? If our 
study makes the claim more plausible that the links between the important but 
relatively uncharted territory of community governance among business organ-
isations and the mature theory of natural CPRs are worth exploring further, we 
have not written in vain.
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